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The Advantages of the Civil Law Judicial Design as
the Model for Emerging Legal Systems
CHARLES H. KOCH, JR.-
Currently, a number of societies around the world are reforming their legal
systems, often upon emerging from years of oppression. Two transatlantic models,
the civil law and common law, will have a great influence on these reforms. For
one thing, the two basic models already cover over 70 percent of the world's popu-
lation in some 62 percent of the existing legal systems.' Moreover, there will be
many practical, economic advantages to westernizing a legal system, which neces-
sarily means incorporating at least some aspects of one or both transatlantic
models. The key is to extract the best features of the models and adapt them to the
specific legal culture. 2 The civil law approach to judicial design in particular has
much to recommend it. A dominant feature of the civil law model is the responsi-
bility it places on the judge in dispute resolution.3 True, common law judges have
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1. See University of Ottawa, at http'//www.droitcivil.uottawa.ca/world-legal-systems/eng-
monde.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2003).
2. Comparative law commentators observe that it is possible for reformers to borrow from
quite different legal systems. GEORGE N. SFEIR, MODERNIZATION OF THE LAW IN ARAB STATES: AN
INVESTIGATION INTO CURRENT CIVIL, CRIMINAL, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD 95
(1998) ("[Borrowing by Arab code writers] all goes to prove Alan Watson's assertion that success-
ful borrowing could be made from a very different legal system as the law reformer looks for an
idea in the foreign system which could be transformed into part of the law of his country" (citing
Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 L. Q. REV. 79 (1976))).
3. The most often recognized distinction between the two systems is the civil law's "code" ori-
entation and the common law's case method of evolving the law. That is, the common law judge
is said to have the authority to make law and the civil law judge may only find the law from legis-
lation. This distinction is important but subtle. As Merryman in his famous guide to the civil law
for U.S. lawyers wrote:
The distinction between legislative and judicial production of law can be mislead-
ing. There is probably at least as much legislation in force in a typical American
state as there is in a typical European or Latin American nation.... The authority
of legislation [in the U.S.] is superior to that of judicial decisions; statutes supersede
contrary judicial decisions(constitutional questions aside), but not vice versa .... If,
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more authority in the sense that they can evolve the law through precedent,
whereas civil law judges do not have that authority.4 The civil law judge, however,
dominates individual litigations and hence sound dispute resolution depends on
the quality of its judges and on assuring that they have the wherewithal to perform
their responsibilities to the best of their abilities. Thus, the lessons from civil law ju-
dicial design are particularly worthy of consideration in reforming a legal system.
Emerging legal systems should look to civil law judicial design because fo-
cusing reform on the judiciary has several advantages. Judges are important to
competent dispute resolution whether the base system derives from the common
law or civil law. Able judges can be the great equalizers, assuring fair litigation
regardless of the relative resources of the litigants. The common law relies on
the performance of its lawyers and on advocacy to assure successful litigation,
but lawyers are responsible to their clients alone. Judges, on the other hand, are
neutrals who are responsible to the public and ultimately justice. Furthermore,
the judiciary is an identifiable and discrete component of any legal system and
judicial performance and conduct can be subject to public scrutiny. Reform no-
tions based on the common law would naturally focus on the development of a
competent private bar and scrutiny of its performance, but lawyers are less iden-
tifiable and manageable as a group than judges, and formal techniques for assur-
ing quality, as we see in the U.S., are largely ineffective.
Reference to the civil law model may have another advantage for many
emerging legal systems. The role of judges in large non-transatlantic legal cul-
tures may make the civil law judicial model more compatible with traditional cus-
tomary or religiously-based legal attitudes. Judges in many of these cultures are
not so much presiding officials responsible for fair litigation and choosing the
winner as they are counselors, educators, or even parents charged with guiding
however, one thinks of codification not as a form but as the expression of an ideol-
ogy, and if one tries to understand that ideology and why it achieves expression in
code form, then one can see how it makes sense to talk about codes....
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF
WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 26-27 (2d ed. 1985).
4. Id. Some suggest that common law and civil law are converging, to this Reimann observes:
"Even if one were to accept that the substantive discrepancies between the civil and common law
have been overrated and that the systems have been converging, there remain indisputable dispar-
ities regarding the respective conceptual tools and general structures." Mathias Reimann, Towards
a European Civil Code: Why Continental Jurists Should Consult Their Transatlantic Colleagues, 73
TUL. L. REV. 1337, 1342 (1999).
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the litigants to the proper outcome.5 That is, judges represent moral authority
rather than state empowerment. The civil law judicial philosophy, which places so
much faith in the judge, might be more adaptable to such legal systems.6
Recognizing the potential for judge-oriented reforms, I look here at the les-
sons which might be derived from civil law's approach as an "outsider," experi-
enced with the U.S. version of the common law model. My purpose is merely to
explore the advantages of civil law judicial design, not to advocate for the adop-
tion of the whole of either model. Indeed, as will be discussed throughout, the
U.S. common law system has incorporated some of these same concepts in its
administrative process.7 The civil law approach might help an emerging legal
culture improve the quality of its judiciary and provide it with better tools to
5. See PHILIP C.C. HUANG, CIVIL JUSTICE IN CHINA: REPRESENTATION AND PRACTICE IN THE
QING 208 (1996) (The task was to promote harmony in society and not to allow a wayward child to
spoil it. "The point was not to forgo clear-cut adjudication in favor of compromise-working, but
rather to take human feeling and relations into account when considering the use of punishment,
and to persuade litigants of the correctness of the court's opinion, after having come to clear-cut
judgment.. based in law."); H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE
DIVERSITY IN LAW 163 (2000) (In Islamic judging: "The law of each case is thus different from the
law of every other case, and all parties, and the qadi [judge], are under an obligation of service to
God to bring together the objectively determined circumstances of the case and the appropriate
principles of the shari'a."). Cf JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 188-89 (1964).
6. Codification itself has certain advantages for emerging legal cultures: "Codification has also
meant that the laws of the nations which have codes are readily adoptable by other nations seeking
a systematic, ordered and text-based foundation for their law." THOMAS GLYN WATKIN, AN HIST-
ORICIAL INTRODUCTION TO MODERN CIVIL LAW 147 (1999).
7. Many of these techniques developed in U.S. administrative adjudications simply because
they are more effective and often fairer in that context. Nonetheless, many of these ideas were
either consciously borrowed from the civil law or unconsciously allowed to filter into U.S. admin-
istrative processes, as demonstrable familiarity with that model legitimized non-common law
thinking. In his oft-cited and highly influential article, Judge Friendly, for example, argues that
the administrative process could learn from the civil law model. Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of
Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1290 (1975). See generally FRANK J. GOODNOW, COMPARATIVE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS NATIONAL AND LOCAL, OF
THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, FRANCE AND GERMANY (The first U.S. administrative law scholar
used a comparative approach in the first U.S. administrative law text.); JAMES M. LANDIS, THE AD-
MINISTRATIVE PROCESS 3-5 (1938). For generations, U.S. administrative law has had available an
insightful comparison with the French civil law, which is BERNARD SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON-LAW WORLD (1954). New Jersey Chief Justice Arthur Vanderbilt
wrote: "Now [Schwartz] has shown us clearly how much we can learn from the French." Id. at
xvi.
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perform an active role in dispute resolution.8 My analysis below takes separately
these two goals of civil law judicial design. 9
I. THE CIVIL LAW GUIDE TO MAKING BETTER JUDGES
Three aspects of the civil law judicial design might be useful for reforming
a judiciary. First, the civil law uses career judges, trained and managed as such.
Second, the civil law provides an active and positive approach to assuring a com-
petent and independent judiciary. Third, the civil law's selective resort to
specialized tribunals provides expert decision making where needed and, more
significantly, provides a strategy for protecting the regular judiciary from com-
promising decision-making responsibilities.
A. Professionalism
Perhaps the most significant distinction between the civil law model and the
common law model is that in the former the judiciary is a corps of specially
8. A neutral measure of people's preferences when dealing with the legal system is difficult, if
not impossible. Sally Engle Merry, in a study of working-class users of courts in a Massachusetts
town, describes how they go to court with feelings of legal entitlement and emerge thinking that
the institution is "indifferent to the ordinary person's problem." SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING
JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS 170
(1990). Ordinary people in real common law courtrooms are likely to see their lawyer as engaging
in ritualistic and counter-intuitive behavior which they neither control nor understand. But what
would a similar study in France or Germany reveal? I have presided at a demonstration civil law
trial with a French judge and observe that litigants (and other interested persons) seem to have a
more congenial opportunity to "tell their story." My law students in simulated civil law proceed-
ings found advantages. On the other hand, one empirical study purports to show that the adver-
sarial process is preferred. See JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 77 (1975). However, because its "pure inquisitorial" model is so dissimi-
lar to the actual civil law model, it shows little more than that students prefer to make their own
decisions. It does have some useful general lessons about optimum factual development which
might be applied in either model. See id. at 83.
9. This article refers to adjudications in the U.S. administrative process. Aman has argued on
several occasions that U.S. administrative law principles of public participation and accountabil-
ity, usually associated with its rulemaking procedures, should be employed to combat global "de-
mocracy deficit." E.g., Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for a New
Administrative Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687 (2002). I would urge that U.S. rulemaking procedures
could also enhance effective democracy "on the ground" for emerging democracies as well, but
that is not the focus of this article.
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trained professionals. The common law does not consider judging to be a sep-
arate legal profession and hence the U.S. judiciary is staffed by "amateur" judges
largely drawn from a related, but in many ways dissimilar, profession, legal ad-
vocacy. Civil law judges are educated as judges and usually serve that role
throughout their professional lives." Budding judges enter an apprenticeship as
judges, not as advocates. They move from the apprenticeship supervised by
senior judges, to junior positions on less important courts, to ever more impor-
tant positions on more important courts. They serve within a community of
judges who are available to assist them in becoming better judges. Their promo-
tions are based on performance and are controlled by judges themselves in some
form of council.
A major advantage of this design is that it necessarily creates an esprit de
corps. A massive psychological literature demonstrates that people in positions of
trust, including judges, tend to live up to that trust. 2 Lynn Stout identified three
factors that determine socially conscious behavior in judges: a tendency to do
what they are told by an authority figure, a "sense of membership in a common
group," and a degree of anticipation that their colleagues will cooperate. 3 All of
these factors are promoted, or in the case of an emerging legal system created, by
the civil law judicial corps strategy.
No doubt judicial elitism has its disadvantages. Civil law judges make up an
anonymous and perhaps "bloodless" elite. As Martin Vranken summarized the
effect: "Judges in the civil law are civil servants who display a civil service men-
tality.""4 Common law judges, who generally rise from practice, have been
forced to deal with real world situations. The civil law system offsets the lack of
10. See MERRYMAN, supra note 3, at 34-35.
11. See, e.g., NIGEL FOSTER, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM & LAWS 90 (2d ed. 1996) ("In Germany the
judiciary is a separate career, embarked upon by professionally qualified lawyers after educational
and practical legal training; it is not entered after a number of years' practice as an attorney.");
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN K6TZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 124 (Tony Weir trans., 3d
ed. 1998) ("Judges in France, like those in Italy and Germany, are career judges; they opt for a judi-
cial career early in life, they are appointed by the state after passing the necessary examinations,
and they are generally promoted to more important positions in higher courts on the basis of their
performance and years of service."). But see JoHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER:
LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX 106 (1991) (stating that the U.S. occupation of Japan attempted to
consolidate lawyering and judging).
12. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout,Judges as Altruistic Hierarchs, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1605 (2002).
13. Id. at 1615-16.
14. MARTIN VRANKEN, FUNDAMENTALS OF EUROPEAN CIVIL LAW 62 (1997).
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practical experience somewhat with the apprenticeship program in which
judges must for some time work at the "street level." Moreover, studies show
that practicing U.S. lawyers, not surprisingly, bring their practice perspective
with them to the bench. 5 The civil law approach institutionalizes an other-
worldly objectivity.
A graver danger is that this isolated and elite corps will develop its own cul-
tural norms. Mitu Gulati and C.M.A. McCauliff demonstrate: "[T]he behavior
of judges is primarily governed by internally generated norms that can be alto-
gether different from the officially stated organizational rules."' 6 Studies of U.S.
judges find that such "politics" in a judicial community might bias individual
decisions. 7 Still, these community norms have many positive effects and con-
tribute significantly to the competence and the integrity of the judiciary. 8 The
key is to capture these benefits while guarding against the drawbacks. For the
reasons given in the next section, the civil law judicial corps concepts might have
the best chance of doing so.
15. See Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences of the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of
Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1470 (1998) ("Although we initially shared [skepticism
about the impact of prior employment], our study found nearly every prior employment variable
of these judges, with the exception of law professors and political experience (and perhaps prosec-
utorial experience), to be significant in some manner.").
16. Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 161
(1998).
17. See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, andthe D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV.
1717 (1997); Richard L. Revesz, Ideology, Collegiality, and the D.C. Circuit: A Reply to Chief Judge
Harry T Edwards, 85 VA. L. REV. 805 (1999) (defending 1997 study of effects of ideology in judicial
decisionmaking in environmental cases in the D.C. circuit from Edwards' criticism); see also Rich-
ard L. Revesz, Litigation and Settlement in the Federal Appellate Courts: Impact of Panel Selection Pro-
cedures on Ideologically Divided Court, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 685 (2000) (examining the effects of the D.C.
Circuit practice of announcing the composition of its panels before parties have prepared their
briefs). While disagreeing with many of the negative implications of Revesz's work, Chief Judge
Edwards seems to recognize the impact of a judicial community. See Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality
and Decision Making in the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1998) [hereinafter Collegiality and Deci-
sion Making] (criticizing the methodology and conclusions of the Revesz study, and suggesting that
discussions among the judges may explain some of Revesz's results). See generally Harry T. Edwards
& Linda Elliott, Beware of Numbers (and Unsupported Claims ofludicial Bias), 80 WAs. U. L. Q. 723
(2002) (criticizing the methodology of a study which alleged anti-plaintiff bias in appellate courts).
18. Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 16 at 169-70 ("Social sanctions in a closely knit group [such
as judges] whose members repeatedly interact are likely to be highly effective. If these informal
nonlegal sanctions work effectively, an expensive, formal enforcement system may be unneces-
sary."). Chief Judge Edwards would seem to agree with the value of community norms within a
court. See Collegiality and Decision Making, supra note 17.
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B. The Mechanics offudicial Independence and Competence
The civil law judicial design, in the context of an emerging legal system, has
more potential for bringing about an independent judiciary than adoption of the
U.S. judicial design. The U.S. system relies on public vetting and job security, but
that strategy may not be particularly effective, especially in a legal culture with no
tradition of selecting independent judges. Even in the U.S., the selection and pro-
motion process can be extremely political and hence compromise the indepen-
dence of U.S. judges. Federal judges have lifetime job security under Article III
of the U.S. Constitution, but even this insulation does not seem to guarantee truly
independent judging. 9 More to the point, most U.S. judges do not have constitu-
tional protections. Some 87 percent of U.S. state judges are elected and serve a
term of years.2" Of course, both the appointment process and elections monitor
performance, but both are inherently political. Hence, impartial judicial decision
making may be compromised by the judge's concern for the political ramifications
of certain decisions. Moreover, the vast majority of both federal and state adjudi-
cations, one might say the ones that really matter to most people, are carried out
by so-called "legislative courts" having no constitutional protection.2' Vast num-
bers of adjudications are conducted by administrative judges, many of whom
19. This is true in part because it legitimizes habits of thought. See William S. Jordan, 1II,
Judges, Ideology, and Policy in the Administrative State: Lessons from a Decade of Hard Look Remands
of EPA Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 45, 99 (2001) ("1 would not characterize these results as demon-
strating strategic ideological voting. To the contrary, as Judge Wald has argued, they appear to re-
flect differences in 'the personalit[ies] and life experiences that lead the judge to vote Democratic
or Republican' in the first place, rather than adherence to a party or personal ideological agenda."
(quoting Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned from One Hundred Years of the
Harvard Law Review and Other Great Books, 100 HARV. L. REV. 887, 891 (1987))).
20. "Eighty-seven percent of state appellate and trial judges are selected through direct or reten-
tion elections." NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CALL TO ACTION: STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL
SUMMIT ON IMPROVING JUDICIAL SELECTION 7(2002).
21. While Article Ill of the Constitution vests "judicial power" in courts constituted under its
authority, Congress immediately found that all adjudications could not be conducted by these
courts and created special tribunals under its legislative powers. A literal reading of the Constitu-
tion may require Congress to vest all judicial functions in Article III courts, but long tradition has
validated alternative federal courts and agencies with adjudicative functions. See Richard H. Fal-
lon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 916, 917
(1988) ("'Article Ill literalism' ... [is] unthinkable."). In fact, most of federal adjudications are
conducted by "legislative" courts or administrative tribunals. For example, the Social Security
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have very little protection.22 The result of the U.S. system is that judges are not and
perhaps cannot be insensitive to political influence. Frederick Schauer observed
that U.S. judges are more driven by rational self-interest than we often concede. 23
Studies show that "promotion potential is a factor in understanding lower federal
court behavior."24 In short, the U.S. system has not developed an effective system
for assuring impartiality and independence.
The civil law model does provide such a system.25 Civil law judges them-
selves control management of the judge corps. The French Constitution, for
Administration (SSA) holds hearings on about 500,000 cases a year, more than the entire federal
Article III judiciary. Social Security Administration, Office of Hearings and Appeals, Key Work
-
load Indicator Report 5 (2002), available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplemenr!
2002/2f8-2fl 1.pdf. While these are technically reviewed by an Article III judge, they are actually
reviewed by magistrates, and Article I judges.
22. See John H. Frye III, Survey of Non -ALI Hearing Programs in the Federal Government, 44 AD-
MIN. L. REV. 261 (1992). Nonetheless, the administrative judges with no formal protection as well
as those with only statutory protection generally find themselves to be independent. Charles H.
Koch, Jr., Administrative Presiding Officials Today, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 271, 278-79 (1994). I believe
the survey results demonstrate that institutional norms can be an extremely effective guarantee of
independence because the lack of formal protection seemed to make little difference in the per-
ception, at least, of independence.
23. Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behav-
ior, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 615, 620 (2000) ("In sharing this common ground of belief that what really
matters to judges are their sincere policy preferences,... [legal scholars and political scientists
alike] tend to ignore or downplay the possibility that judges, no less than legislators and bureau-
crats, have strong career-based self-interests that often inform or dominate their policy prefer-
ences."). A study has shown that the Supreme Court is conscious of political actors in setting its
agenda. See Lee Epstein et al., Dynamic Agenda -Setting on the United States Supreme Court: An Em-
pirical Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEcis. 395, 403 (2002) ("Our analysis of the data leads us to con-
clude that the justices do indeed consider the preferences and likely responses of other political
actors in deciding whether to grant certiorari."). But see Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and
Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. CT. EcoN. REv. 1, 2 (1993) ("The
economic analyst has a model of how criminals and contract parties, injurers and accident victims,
parents and spouses-even legislators, and executive officials such as prosecutors-act, but falters
when asked to produce a model of how judges act."); Edward Rubin, The New Legal Process, The
Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1399 (1996)
("[N]o stable [rational choice] theory has emerged to explain the behavior of judges .... ").
24. Sisk et al., supra note 15, at 1493 (citing Mark Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior of What's
'Unconstitutional'about he Sentencing Commission?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORg. 183, 193 (1991)).
25. Civil law judges also have life tenure. See, e.g., LA CONSTITUTION, art. 64, translated in CON-
STITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: FRANCE 19 (Gisbert H. Flanz, ed., Oceana Publica-
tions 2000) ("Judges are irremovable."); FOSTER, supra note 11, at 90-91 ("Judges are guaranteed
complete independence ... Judges cannot be sacked unless it is by judicial order following a judi-
cial hearing.").
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example, establishes a disciplinary body dominated by judges. 6 That is, the ju-
diciary itself controls promotion and assignment. 7 In contrast, the U.S. judiciary
can only engage in negative management, disciplining judges whose conduct is
so egregious that it cannot be allowed to continue. The civil law system allows
the judicial authorities to provide positive incentives and mentoring, as well as
discipline. Emerging legal systems should adopt this approach and constitute a
self-governing judicial body. Such a closed system is not without dangers, as sug-
gested above, but potential shortcomings can be controlled by transparency and
process.28
Many U.S. state administrative judiciaries are adopting a more manage-
ment-oriented approach to their judges. These states bring administrative
judges together into one administrative unit, usually called a "central panel,"
from which individual agencies request judges.29 This approach captures much
of the same advantages as the civil law model in monitoring and motivating op-
timum judicial performance, while at the same time protecting judges from ex-
ternal forces.3" In short, a self-managed judiciary has suggested its advantages in
the United States, and its adoption demonstrates that it can be incorporated into
a common law setting.
Common lawyers might argue that judicial self-management in the civil law
system dangerously consolidates authority and hence increases the opportunity
26. LA CONSTITUTION, art. 65, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 25,
at 19.
27. See JOHN BELL ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW 64 (1998) ("Since promotion is central to
the career of all judges, its organization is all the more relevant and must be strictly regulated.").
28. The danger is that the judicial elite will themselves distort judging. See J. MARK RAMSEYER
& MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 17 (1999) ("This institutional
structure radically shapes the incentives judges face: fundamentally it gives judges an incentive to
act in those ways that the people deciding their transfers consider appropriate.").
29. Flanagan identified twenty-five states and at least three major cities. James F. Flanagan, Re-
defining the Role of the State Administrative Law Judge: Central Panels and Their Impact on State AL]
Authority and Standards of Agency Review, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1355, 1357 (2002). This approach has
been proposed for federal adjudications for years. See e.g., Antonin Scalia, The ALl Fiasco-A Re-
prise, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 79 (1979) ("The problem of improper influence would also be solved
by implementing proposals for establishment of a unified ALJ corps, headed by an independent
administrator."). For several reasons, the unified panel has not been adopted in the federal system.
See PAUL VERKUIL ET AL., THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY 171-74 (1992).
30. See John W. Hardwicke, The Central Panel Movement: A Work in Progress, 53 ADMIN. L. REV.
419, 425-27 (2001).
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for corruption. Examples of corruption in civil law systems are not scarce.3' The
adversarial process in the common law system, by contrast, relies on the lawyers
and judges to check each other. The many examples of this system breaking down
demonstrate that this guarantee is not flawless.32 The judges in any system may be
corrupted. The search is for the optimum mechanism for preventing corruption,
especially in systems without a positive tradition. The judge-managed civil law
system might be better able to accomplish that.
C. Assuring Competence and Independence in the Litigation Itself
The civil law system extends this self-regulation of judicial performance
into litigation itself. The civil law process utilizes several judges, some to build
the record, others to manage the litigation, and others to bring the case to a deci-
sion. For most significant litigation, both civil and criminal, the judges sit in
panels.33 So the civil law system, with several judges involved, creates numerous
whistleblowing opportunities. The threat of whistleblowing itself assures some
31. See Edgardo Buscaglia,An Analysis of Corrupt Practices Within the Judiciary in Latin America,
in ESSAYS IN LAW AND ECONOMICS IV 223, 234 (Claus Ott & George Von Wangenhem eds., 1998)
("[C]orruption runs rampant within the judiciary.... [Tihe widespread effects of corruption on
the overall social system are extremely pernicious."). Nagle, herself a former Colombian judge,
writes: "In Latin America, corruption is so intensely woven in the fabric of government that ac-
countability to the people is of almost no consequence .... Furthermore, there is little historical
precedent for judicial activism and independence. These are concepts foreign to the legal tradi-
tions of the civil law system, and particularly to the civil law systems of Latin American." Luz
Estella Nagle, The Cinderella of Government: Judicial Reform in Latin America, 30 CAL. W. INT'L L.
J. 345, 370 (2000). Those from other civil law systems might contest the verdict on independence
although a certain type of judicial activism is foreign (literally) to the civil law philosophy. It
should be noted that Latin American systems are increasingly a mix of the civil law and common
law models so that lacking the institutionalized norms of an elite corps it is also without the im-
bued constraints of the judicial tradition of established common law systems. Again it is a ques-
tion of which is more easily created in a system with neither.
32. For example, a study prepared for the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Re-
moval found numerous cases of resignations and several impeachments for corruption. EMILY
FIELD VAN TASSEL, WHY JUDGES RESIGN: INFLUENCE ON FEDERAL JUDICIAL SERVICE, 1789 TO 1992, at
17 (1993), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/judgeres.pdf/$File/judgeres.pdf
("The rate of judicial departures following allegations of misbehavior is much higher than either
the impeachment or the conviction rate [because judges usually resign rather than face such alle-
gations]."). See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
33. See ANDREW WEST ET AL., THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 77, 83 (2d ed. 1998).
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level of integrity.34 Collegiality creates incentives for acting within the institu-
tional norms and a deterrent against judges who might be tempted. The U.S.
system depends on the practicing bar to police judicial corruption at the trial
level. A system in which the judges, as well as lawyers, police the judiciary seems
more likely to guarantee a degree of judicial integrity.
The civil law model is also more likely to alleviate innocent cognitive biases.
An empirical study found that judges (like everyone else in daily life) use heuris-
tics in judicial decision making.35 Heuristics are mental shortcuts which are use-
ful, but can produce systematic errors, or "cognitive illusions." The most potent
device for correcting these errors is training in decision making.36 The long
training and experience of civil law judges as fact finders and decision makers
will better serve this purpose, although the common law system could no doubt
educate its judges about these dangers once they reach the bench. Civil law use
of collegial judicial decision making can also combat cognitive illusions.3 7
D. Special Courts and the Implications for Judging
Established civil law systems have detached certain tasks and created special-
ized court systems to deal with them. The Germans, for example, have five sepa-
rate court systems, only one of which is a general law court, and a constitutional
court.38 The French also have special courts.39 The U.S. scheme generally avoids
specialist courts for reasons that might be irrelevant to an emerging legal system.4"
The adoption of separate specialized court systems by an emerging legal system
34. Frank Cross & Emerson Tiller,Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistle-
blowing on the Federal Courts ofAppeals, 107 YALE L. J. 2155, 2174 (1998) ("In short, on multi-judge
panels, the minority judge can serve as a whistleblower by revealing these biasing cognitive short-
cuts. Once the majority can no longer readily rationalize its decision under the legal model, it will
frequently concede to the commands of that model.").
35. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 805-11 (2001).
36. See id. at 821 ("[Jludges might learn to educate themselves about cognitive illusions so that
they can try to avoid the errors that these illusions tend to produce.").
37. See id. at 826-27.
38. See ANKE FRECKMANN & THOMAS WEGERICH, THE GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM 129 (1999) ("Each
of these jurisdictions is headed by a Federal Court as the highest court of the Federation and as the
court of last resort.").
39. See WEST, supra note 33, at 76-81.
40. See Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U.
PA. L. REV. 1111 (1990).
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might enhance expert dispute resolution, protect the customary courts, and insu-
late the regular judiciary from tasks that are considered inappropriate.
One reason for specialization is to make the best use of expertise. Specialist
courts increase judicial expertise and probably reach more objective judgments
based on technical considerations. Such specialization might recommend itself
to societies in which technical human resources are in short supply, especially
among those persons who might participate in litigation. In those cases in which
the U.S. system uses expert tribunals, usually administrative agencies, their de-
cisions are ultimately reviewed by a generalist court." U.S. legal culture finds
benefit in at some point having the experts justify themselves to non-experts.42 In
this regard, an emerging legal system might choose between the two strategies
depending on the desired dominance of expert decisionmaking.
A second reason emerging legal systems might establish specialized courts is
the protection of the indigenous legal culture. Certain courts may be and often
have been created to assure foreign interests a "modern" forum for their brand
of conflict, e.g. finance or commerce, and yet the society may continue its indige-
nous legal tradition in alternative tribunals. A developing society could isolate its
"modernization" concession by adopting special court systems, with special ju-
risdiction, procedures, and expertise.43 Those courts can be separated from the
courts that are culturally sensitive and expert in the customary laws.
Reforming legal systems may consider the third reason civil law systems
have created special courts. Underlying the civil law philosophy is a fear of as-
signing social policy to the judiciary. Indeed, much of the division between the
civil law and common law results from different perceptions of the courts and
the relationship between courts and the "democratic" institutions of govern-
ment. Simply put, the common law grew out of distrust of majorities, while the
civil law reflects a distrust of elitist courts.44 Civil law jurisprudence generally,
41. The only exception in the federal system is the Federal Circuit which has subject matter,
rather than geographic, jurisdiction to review certain specialized tribunals and even its decisions
may be reviewed by the generalist Supreme Court. Also, review of administrative expert judg-
ments is often limited and sometimes precluded. 3 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND PRACTICE, §§ 9.2r4], 13.1 (2d ed. 1997).
42. See Fallon,supra note 21, at 917.
43. Civil law systems, for example, have special commercial courts. RAYMOND YOUNGS, ENGLISH,
FRENCH & GERMAN COMPARATIVE LAW 80 (1998).
44. See VRANKEN,sUpra note 14, at 63 ("[O]n the Continent a narrow reading of statutes was ad-
vocated out of distrust for the judiciary, whereas in the common law any distrust tended to be di-
rected towards the legislature who was perceived to be encroaching upon the court's territory.").
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although not universally, grew out of experience that suggests that courts can do
at least as much damage as any other institution of government. Fear of the ju-
diciary created the instincts behind the commitment to statutory language and
prohibition against judicial law making.4" Many emerging democracies have ex-
perienced the abuse and excesses of the judiciary and hence are drawn to meth-
ods that limit its interference in social policy.46
Nonetheless, modern societies need tribunals with law-making responsibil-
ity, and the civil law satisfies this need without ceding too much authority to the
judiciary by granting limited authority to courts designed for the purpose. The
specialist court schemes empower some judicial forays into social policy while
45. The relevance of a code system for our discussion of the judiciary is the enthusiastic denial of
judicial law-making power. JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 431 (1968) ("The chief leg-
acy of the [French] Revolution was not judicial submission to the disciplines of the codes but a
deep-seated, widely-held conviction that judges lacked lawmaking power."). By confining law
making to the legislature, a code regime confines judicial discretion. See RENE DAVID & JOHN BRIER-
LEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
THE LAW 134-35 (3d ed. 1985). The common law system sees judge-made law as the real law. See
HENRY HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLI-
CATION OF LAW 163-64 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) ("The body of deci-
sional law announced by the courts in the disposition of these [individual] problems tends always to
be the initial and continues to be the underlying body of law governing the society."). While com-
mon law systems have many codes, the civil law commitment to codes expresses a commitment to
language which is not present in the United States. Still, the common law progenitor British judges
are confined by the notion of "parliamentary sovereignty." SIR WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER
FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 29 (7th ed. 1994) ("The sovereignty of Parliament is a peculiar fea-
ture of the British constitution which exerts a constant and powerful influence. In particular, it is an
ever-present threat to the position of the courts; and it naturally inclines the judges towards caution
in their.attitude to the executive, since Parliament is effectively under the executive's control.").
46. See, e.g., T'UNG-TSU CH'0, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA UNDER THE CH'ING 14-35 (1962).
"In short, it is no exaggeration to say that the local administration was in the hands of magis-
trates." Id. at 14. "[The gentry] and the local officials together determined the local policy and ad-
ministration and shared the control of society .... This stability was threatened only when the
dissatisfaction of the people was intense enough to culminate in open revolt." Id. at 198-99. See
also PHILIP C.C. HUANG, CODE, CUSTOM, AND LEGAL PRACTICE IN CHINA 15-16 (2001) (describing
Chinese drafting of new civil and criminal codes based on the German code); GEORGE N. SFEIR,
MODERNIZATION OF THE LAW IN ARAB STATES: AN INVESTIGATION INTO CURRENT CIVIL, CRIMINAL,
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD 23-50 (1998) (noting, however, that this shift
might have been because the existing courts were just incapable of dealing with the needs of a
modern, liberal state rather than that they were the instruments of oppression); NATHAN J. BROWN,
THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD: COURTS IN EGYPT AND THE GULF 15 (1997) (giving as exam-
ples of the use of courts as instruments of oppression: Israeli occupation, South African apartheid,
Nazi Germany, and Allende's Chile).
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generally protecting democracy from a closed judiciary. Based on the German
model, civil law systems tend to have a constitutional court separated from those
courts handling regular legal business.47 Thereby, civil law systems satisfy the
need for constitutional review of the legislature.48 Similarly, many civil law sys-
tems have separate administrative courts to handle suits against the government,
which necessarily raise sensitive policy issues.49
In addition to confining judicial authority, the specialist court strategy also
protects the regular judiciary from the taint of engaging in political and policy,
sensitive controversies. The United States assigns almost all types of issues to one
judiciary. The U.S. experience might show emerging legal systems the value of
insulating its judiciary from certain types of issues. The separation between legal
responsibility and law making in courts dealing with value-laden societal issues
might have advantages for establishing the credibility of a new judiciary.
II. THE CIVIL LAw GUIDE TO MAKING JUDGES
MORE EFFECTIVE AT DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The judge's role in civil law litigation provides the second group of valuable
lessons for emerging legal systems. Judicial control of dispute resolution is the
hallmark of the civil law system. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) of the
European Union (EU) provides a multi-cultural example of the work of judges
in a civil law-rooted process.5" After the pleading stage, the parties' control vir-
tually ends and the court takes over. A special judicial officer is assigned the case
and serves as a "judge-rapporteur," responsible for building the record. Like all
47. See WATKIN,supra note 6, at 6 ("Another hallmark of civil law systems therefore is their pos-
session of a constitutional court or some such body to hear and determine [whether a particular
piece of legislation offends against the fundamental law of the state].").
48. See Louis FAVOREU, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS 4-12 (Alavin A. Levasseur et. al. trans., 2001).
49. See Watkin,supra note 6, at 370 ("Most civilian countries have separate administrative courts
to deal with matters of administrative law .. "). See also SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, at 11 ("[Council
of State's (highest French administrative court)] decisions were swayed just as much by policy as
by law."); JURCEN SCHWARZE, EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9 (1992) (noting the parallel be-
tween the French Council of State and the European Court of Justice whose decisions also have
"considerable political repercussions").
50. However, the ECJ's procedures were largely modeled after the French Council of State, the
highest administrative court. See L. NEVILLE BROWN & JOHN S. BELL, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 266-67 (4th ed. 1993).
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civil law courts, the ECJ runs the investigation through the rapporteur and has
available its own expert advice. The rapporteur's report will serve as the basis for
a decision. Before the Court itself considers the case, an independent judicial
officer, the "Advocate General," prepares an opinion to "assist" the Court." Al-
though the extent to which the court adopts the advocate general's opinion may
vary, the report is always extremely important.52 Thus, the judiciary controls fact
gathering and obtains independent expert advice, legal and otherwise.
Perhaps led by the civil law system, the U.S. system incorporates similar no-
tions in the design of administrative adjudications.53 The U.S. administrative
process also often places considerable responsibility on the administrative judi-
ciary and provides it with similar tools to carry out that responsibility. These ac-
commodations to an active administrative judiciary are noted below to
demonstrate the advantages of these concepts and that they can exist and per-
haps selectively improve adjudication within the common law tradition.
The civil law process has developed several useful procedural strategies to
allow the judiciary to carry out its active role.54 First, the civil law makes the judges
responsible for the adequacy of the decisional foundation, the "record." Second,
and related, civil law judges manage the development of a continuing process
whereby the body of information develops over time rather than at a single event,
the trial. This process also captures the advantages of a mix of written and oral
presentation. Third, the civil law process assures judges access to their own expert
advice and counsel. Fourth, the civil law process is designed for judicial decision
making. Let us look at the value of these strategies, particularly for reform of an
emerging legal system.
51. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar. 25,
1957, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 123; L. NEVILLE BROWN & TOM KENNEDY, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 64 (5th ed. 2000) ("His title ... is something of a misnomer, since he is
really no more an advocate than he is a general. On the contrary, he is a member of the Court.")
(Internal citation omitted).
52. Anthony Arnull observed: "[Miost students of the Court would probably say that it is fairly
unusual-although by no means unheard of-for the Court to depart from the Opinion of its Advo-
cate General and there are reasons for believing that, whether or not an Opinion is followed, the
Judges find it helpful." ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE 8 (1999).
53. Administrative law advocates a procedural flexibility which allows it to escape the dogma of
traditional Anglo-American procedures and an eclecticism that allows it to incorporate useful al-
ternatives from other legal cultures. See Aman,supra note 9, at 1715.
54. Not "activist" in U.S. terms, common law judges have considerable law-making power,
which can be exercised to the point of creating extremely active lawmakers. Civil law judges are
not to make law, but some perform their "interpretive" function in an activist way.
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First, the civil law court is responsible for an adequate record.55 In both
criminal and civil proceedings, various judges contribute to the record and the
president of the court assures that the record is complete before it goes to the de-
cisional stage. The fact gathering, as well as fact finding, responsibility of the
civil law judge has much to recommend it to developing nations attempting to
improve their litigation processes. The civil law makes the public assume much
of the cost of litigation. This approach might be essential to legal systems in
which the litigants are likely to have little to spare for dispute resolution. Judicial
control can make the fact gathering affirmatively objective. In contrast, the
common law judge acts negatively to prevent the introduction of certain types of
information at the trial stage, with this decision often determined by formalistic
rules. By making the development of the record, in essence, a public commit-
ment, the civil law judicial system makes litigants' resources, representatives,
and conduct less important to a fair result.
The U.S. administrative process often places the responsibility for an ade-
quate record on the government. In many programs, U.S. administrative law
judges (ALJs) must actively assure an adequate record and that approach has
been consistently affirmed.56 The Social Security Administration (SSA), a classic
example, relies on its ALJs to assure an adequate record.57 The claimant in an
SSA case is not always represented, and in those cases the judge must assure that
the claimant's case is sufficiently developed. Responsibility for developing the
record for a denial of SSA benefits rests with the ALJ because no participant in
the hearing opposes the grant.58 This system is often criticized by adherents to
the adversary process, but it merely adopts a different vision of the role of the
judge, one consistent with the civil law process. Indeed, one effort to build-in
55. In contrast, the common law process does not hold the judges responsible for a complete
record. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Cannon 3B(7) cmt. (2000) ("A judge must not inde-
pendently investigate facts in a case and must consider only the evidence presented."); see JEFFREY
SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS 172 (3d ed. 2000) ("Unlike the European system, in
which judges have the primary responsibility for the development of litigative facts, American
judges are generally permitted only to consider the evidence and testimony that is produced by
counsel.").
56. 2 KocH,supra note 41, §5.25[2], at 70.
57. The vast majority of these cases involve challenges to the denial of disability benefits under
either the federal insurance program or need-based welfare.
58. The denial is sometimes characterized as the agency's position, but the agency was estab-
lished to pay the benefits, so its position is much like that of the judges: to make sure the claimant
should get the benefits.
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adversariness by having someone represent the denial was a failure.59 However,
in a civil law vein, one recent study suggested that ALJs use "counselors," whose
responsibility would be to assist the judge in assuring a complete record.6
Second, the civil law record is developed over time; its development is truly
a "process." While there is an oral trial at the end, much of formal evidence is
gathered and made part of the record prior to the oral proceeding. The oral pro-
ceeding is quite abbreviated, largely confined to tying up loose ends and reach-
ing a decision. The common law "pre-trial" is just that, merely preparation for
the trial in which all information is presented and the decision is reached. Logis-
tically, the civil law process seems preferable in a context in which few resources
are available for litigation. A major advantage is that the parties can better man-
age the scheduling of much of the record building. Indeed, a preparatory judge
might go to the witnesses to develop evidence rather than requiring them to be
present at a particular time (usually inconvenient) and place (to which transpor-
tation may be difficult). The extended record building might also take better ad-
vantage of scarce attorney time in systems just developing their corps of private
litigators. The dossiers are constantly available so that a lawyer can manage re-
view of the evidence more efficiently. Moreover, lawyers can review the growing
record during the course of the investigation and can recommend that the judge
seek additional evidence, request experts or different experts, question other
witnesses, or further examine those witnesses questioned.
59. The SSA admitted failure and ended the project. Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disabil-
ity Insurance; Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled; Discontinuance
of the SSA Representation Project, 52 Fed. Reg. 17,285 (May 7, 1987) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R.
pts. 404 and 416). Its explanation was unhelpful, but a U.S. district court, enjoining it, observed:
"Has the quality of the hearing dispositions improved? The answer ... has to be a resounding
no." Sailing v. Bowen, 641 F. Supp. 1046, 1062 (W.D. Va. 1986).
60. In a study commissioned by the Social Security Advisory Board, three administrative law
scholars concluded:
Given the potential downsides of introducing or experimenting with the adversary
process in this setting and our judgment that such a step would fail to advance the
crucial need to improve the record development process, we conclude that the best
SSA "representative" would be a non-adversary Counselor who could help provide
the ALJ with a timely and complete record for decision.
FRANK BLOCH ET AL., INTRODUCING NONADVERSARIAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES TO IMPROVE
THE RECORD FOR DECISION IN SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY ADJUDICATIONS 73-74 (2003) (report on
file with the author).
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This process leads to a decision based largely on a written record. The reli-
ance on written materials makes the proceeding less burdensome for the law-
yers, parties, and witnesses. It provides the judge with an opportunity to engage
in more thoughtful consideration. Indeed, while such written procedures might
be inconsistent with common law philosophy, U.S. administrative law often cap-
tures these same advantages.61 Also, writing, as the administrative process has
shown, is far superior for introducing expert-type evidence. Even in developing
countries, litigation is likely to revolve around expert information, e.g. medical,
engineering, or even custom and usage information. The more efficient the
gathering of that evidence the better.
The civil law written process facilitates correction of mistakes of fact and law.
Reliance on written records allows the civil law system to engage in de novo re-
view of lower court judgments.62 In an emerging legal system in which the
breadth of judicial expertise is likely to be thin, this de novo review would pro-
mote consistency and accuracy as well as integrity. The U.S. administrative pro-
cess uses the same techniques, so that administrative appellate authorities
generally have authority to substitute judgment on both law and fact.63 As in the
civil law system, acceptance of a written record validates substitution of judgment
61. Broad discretion to incorporate written procedures was confirmed by the U.S. Supreme
Court. See Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 620-21 (1973) (approv-
ing the use of written procedures even when the statute seems to require an oral hearing); see also
Hoyl v. Babbitt, 129 F.3d 1377, 1386 (10th Cir. 1997) (explaining that a written hearing may satisfy
procedural due process under the U.S. Constitution). Increased use of written materials may be
making its way into English courts. See T.H. Bingham, "There is a World Elsewhere": The Chang-
ing Perspectives of English Law, 41 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 513, 526 (1992) (speaking of the increased
use of written materials: "[Il]f a judge of (say) the immediate post-war period were to return to the
courts today, whether at first instance or on appeal, he would feel himself to be in an environment
that would feel quite strange and, as he might think, un-English.").
62. See VRANKEN, supra note 14, at 59. The Supreme Court of Cassation, the highest French
court, is not strictly a court of appeals because it only reexamines points of law and it may not re-
vise decisions as a court of appeals would. See CHRISTIAN DADOMO & SUSAN FARRAN, THE FRENCH
LEGAL SYSTEM 189 (2d ed. 1996).
63. Traditionally, administrative appellate review is de novo. The U.S. Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA), the statute which sets general procedural norms for all federal agencies, codifies
this tradition when it provides: "On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has
all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision ......5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000).
However, some administrative schemes, particularly in the states, impose more limited review.
See generally Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism: State Administrative Procedures and Institutional
Design, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 551 (2001).
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for that of the presiding official who actually heard the testimony.64 The adminis-
trative process, like the civil law model, finds that values of consistency and equal-
ity of treatment justify independent fact finding by a review tribunal.65
Third, the civil law gives its judges the assistance they need to fulfill their
extensive responsibility. The civil law judge, for one thing, has control over and
use of expert information. The judge identifies the experts and their loyalty is to
the court.' The parties can monitor judicial conduct because a lawyer who dis-
agrees with an expert may request another expert. The system polices the judge
here by making denial of this request the only one subject to what in the U.S.
would be called interlocutory appeal, appeal before the trial.67 The publicly
financed expert scheme is another way the civil law system levels any inequality
in litigant resources.68 Given the relatively scarce expertise in developing
societies, a party's ability to husband the available experts may be particularly
damaging to fair dispute resolution.
Again, the argument that this process would violate some fundamental
common law principles can be met by reference to the U.S. administrative pro-
cess. Admittedly, judges in the U.S. system are not allowed to consult their own
64. That the one who hears the witness is best able to evaluate the testimony is a fundamental
assumption of the common law. However, this assumption may not be supportable in fact. See
Olin Guy Wellborn,Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075 (1991); see also Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A
Wipe of the Hands, A Lick of the Lips: The Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credi-
bility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157, 1159 (1993) ("Social scientists have thus effectively subjected to empir-
ical trial the validity of... demeanor evidence [in judging credibility]. Surprisingly, successive
testing of this 'fundamental' legal precept has repeatedly demonstrated its fallacy.").
65. In fact, although substitution of judgment on facts by a review authority is felt incompatible
with the common law trial, the U.S. Constitution states that, in some instances, the Supreme
Court "shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact .. " U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.
2 (emphasis added).
66. See CATHERINE ELLIOTT & CATHERINE VERNON, FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 129-30 (2000) ("The
judge's powers concerning oral evidence are very wide .... The French judge has even greater
powers in connection with expert evidence, as the normal practice is for a single neutral expert ap-
pointed by the court. Parties do not normally appoint their own experts."); see also WEST ET AL.,
supra note 33, at 297 ("It is for the judge to choose the expert ... .
67. See WEST ET AL.,supra note 33, at 297.
68. Parties are ultimately billed for the cost of the expert. Still, there is a savings in that they
need only pay for experts sufficient to satisfy the judge rather than redundant experts to counter-
act their opponents' experts. Moreover, a reforming system might consider public financing.
CHARLES H. KOCH, JR.
experts."9 However, the administrative process takes a more liberal approach to
supplying judges with expertise. If providing judges with expert assistants
might improve the quality of a developing litigation system, administrative law
shows that such a system does not necessarily violate common law principles,
such as the exparte doctrine.70
The civil law scheme may also provide its judges with experts in decision
making, as well as record building. Those tribunals in which law making is per-
missible, such as constitutional courts or the French Council of State, are sup-
plied with judicial officers whose duty is to advise the court. The EU supplies
the most universally recognized example, the advocate general, but this institu-
tion was modeled after similar judicial advisors in the French system.71 Nothing
similar to the advocate general type of jurist exists in the U.S. system, but much
recommends it to emerging legal systems that are developing their laws.72 An
advising judicial officer like the EU's advocate general may be beneficial in an
emerging legal system in which the quality of the judges may be quite varied.
Moreover, many developing countries have a need to assure representation of
various groups on their lawmaking tribunals, and an advising judge can add
uniformity and objectivity, as well as expertise, where the primary judges are
selected more for their affiliation than their judicial competence.
Fourth, the civil law system is designed around judicial decision-making re-
sponsibility. Again, this concept would seem inconsistent with the common law
procedure designed around the jury. The common law procedure envisions the
judge as a gatekeeper protecting the lay jury by enforcing certain rules that
69. Under the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, judges may seek legal advice only. MODEL CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 55, at Canon 3B(7). See also SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 55, at 173
("While judges may, under certain circumstances, obtain expert advice concerning the law from
disinterested legal experts, the exception does not extend to experts in other areas.").
70. The Federal Administrative Procedures Act (APA), which covers all U.S. agencies, prohib-
its exparte communication with an "interested person" only. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (2000).
71. "Their function has no parallel in the English legal system, though it is similar to that of a
commissairedugouvernement in the French Conseil d'Etat." T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF Eu-
ROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 55 (1998). The French "government commissioner" advises the adjudi-
cating arm of the Council of State and is not, as the title implies, a representative of the government.
72. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct does provide a very narrow concession to consultation
with legal experts. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 55, at Canon 3B(7)(b) ("A judge
may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law ... if the judge gives notice to the par-
ties of the person consulted and the substance of the advice, and affords the parties a reasonable
opportunity to respond.").
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assure the quality of the record. In fact, most U.S. cases, both civil and criminal,
do not involve juries.73 In addition, administrative adjudications provide for de-
cisions by the administrative judge, even in proceedings that are very nearly
criminal.74 Still, the common law concept is that the trial should be designed to
accommodate a jury decision. In contrast, the civil law system is designed for
decision by judges. As we have seen, this affects record building and the tools
given the judge.
It also affects the judging. Most important cases are decided by a panel of
judges.75 Thus, where the decision is likely made by judges, the collegial checking
and other decisional techniques (e.g. junior judges speak first, assuring some in-
dependence from their seniors) assures more integrity and perhaps competence
especially where competent judges themselves are in short supply. Indeed, this
panel approach educates judges as well, and hence provides the system with expe-
rienced judges without litigants paying the price for judicial apprenticeships.
Another advantage of the civil law approach, which would nonetheless sug-
gest itself even to common law systems, is that judges are trained to make deci-
sions. Common law judges "graduate" from litigation. They are trained as
litigators. This training does prepare them to run the proceeding. However, they
are not trained, experienced, or often psychologically prepared to serve as deci-
sion makers. Judicial training and selection in civil law systems recognizes that
they are not only record guardians, but also decision makers. A significant part
of their training and experience is designed to make them sound decision mak-
ers. An emerging system, either civil or common law (or the United States),
might consider training and mentoring designed to make judges good decision
makers.
73. In the U.S., about 5% of the felony cases and about 1% of the civil cases reach a jury. See
JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 252 (2000).
74. Many U.S. agencies have the authority to order "civil penalties," which although technically
not criminal, are not easily distinguishable from fines which are. See, e.g., Noriega-Perez v. United
States, 179 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 1999) (following Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997)
(involving double jeopardy.)); cf, 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (1997) (authorizing the Federal Trade Com-
mission to order civil penalties). In New York, traffic violations may be heard in administrative
adjudications. N.Y. STATE A.P.A § 102.3 (McKinney 1995).
75. In France, major crimes are judged by a jury composed of nine lay jurors and three judges.
WEST ET AL., supra note 33, at 236.
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CONCLUSION
The common law and the civil law models likely will dominate the develop-
ment of a global legal culture, at least in its first iteration. 6 In turn, this global
legal culture will affect national law and legal institutions, especially in emerg-
ing legal systems. Many legal cultures are looking to the transatlantic models for
guidance in reforming and modernizing their legal systems.
Focusing on better judges and judging has much to recommend it to these
cultures. Many of these cultures already have in place some version of the civil
law models, others have borrowed from the common law model, and still others
retain their customary or religious legal systems, or those systems in practice
dominate over the borrowed scheme. In all of these, the judge is the key to im-
proving their legal system. Since the civil law is judge-oriented, it has many les-
sons for reformers around the world. As I am a common lawyer, there seems to
be some value in my identification of the potential benefits of the "competing"
model. As a U.S. administrative law specialist, it seems useful that I identify in-
stances in which the U.S. common law model has captured some of those advan-
tages in its administrative adjudications. These advantages then may be
universal and appropriate reform options for any legal culture. The key then is
political will.
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